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FINANCE
The role of controllers in modern organization 
continues to develop rapidly. Over the past decades, 
controllers have changed from being proverbial ‘bean-
counters’ to being guardians of economic decision 
making within the firm. They have also changed from 
being passive observers of managerial decision making 
to being active contributors to such decision making. 
This increase in responsibilities for controllers may 
lead to tension. On the one hand, controllers need to 
support management in business decisions, on the 
other hand, controllers are responsible for reporting 
truthfully about such decision making. These two re-
sponsibilities provide controllers with a conflict of 
interest. Frank G.H. Hartmann explains how our 
knowledge of this conflict is enhanced by some recent 
experimental studies on the roles of controllers.
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social relationships between the controller and 
local managers. This, in turn, may be a cause of 
reduced independence and reduced integrity and 
objectivity of unit reporting. In sum, therefore, 
we have a strong reason to suspect that the devel-
opment of controllers’ roles into active support-
ers of business has created a potential tension 
between independence and involvement. The 
question is whether this tension is a cause of 
some of the reporting problems discussed before.
Exploring tensions in the role of controllers
Although there are few people that would deny 
the existence of this tension, there are also rel-
atively few people who have wondered about 
the effects of it. Typically, the literature on 
the design and roles of the controller function 
in organization has taken a rather normative 
perspective. The literature is full of advisory 
claims and recommendations about control-
lers’ behaviors. Controllers should be ‘inde-
pendent’, while also being ‘committed’. They 
should develop into ‘strong controllers’, who 
are able to balance between involvement and 
independence, and withstand any dysfunction-
al inclination. Such normative claims, however, 
are not helpful. One important reason is that 
they simply neglect the fact that controllers are 
humans, and subject to all the forces that are 
known to influence human behaviors. In par-
lers’ fulfillment of this obligation. Above all, it 
requires a relatively high level of independence.
A second responsibility, however, that control-
lers increasingly have is their loyalty and support 
for local managers. Business Unit controllers are 
typically and heavily involved in local decision 
making. Local managers, reversely, typically and 
heavily rely on controllers’ judgments about the 
economic viability of different courses of actions. 
These judgments may range widely. They may 
concern setting up the Net Present Value model 
to evaluate an investment proposal, exploring tax 
legislation in a new foreign country to explore 
saving options, or even involve the calculation of 
performance metrics that affect the manager’s 
bonus. What is central to these obligations is 
the controllers’ actual involvement in the oper-
ational and strategic decision-making processes 
in their units. This also means that they carry re-
sponsibility for the outcomes of these processes.
While it seems generally accepted that man-
agement benefits from the active involvement 
of unit controllers in decision making, the net 
benefits to the firm are less clear. Indeed, local 
controllers add their specialist finance and ac-
counting knowledge to the detailed knowledge 
they have about their unit. This is a powerful 
combination. However, involvement in manage-
rial decision making, and the associated responsi-
bility for the outcomes, is likely to cause stronger 
Controllers and their dual responsibilities
One does not need much of expertise to observe 
the increased attention in society to financial 
scandals. In particular, financial scandals that 
originated in misreporting have put a critical 
spotlight on the quality of financial reporting by 
firms and other organizations. In many of these 
critical accounts, blame is placed on a relatively 
small set of professionals. Typically, audit firms 
are criticized for their violations of profession-
al and legal norms, or general management gets 
blamed for engaging in earnings management. It 
is interesting, however, to look into the role of 
accounting professionals that work inside the 
firm, in order to better explain the incidence and 
perhaps the gravity of the breaking of accounting 
rules. In particular, it is worth investigating the 
roles that decentralized controllers play in con-
temporary firms.
It is now generally believed that the organi-
zational roles of controllers can be captured in 
two major responsibilities. One responsibility 
concerns the so-called fiduciary obligations that 
the controller has towards higher level managers 
and other stakeholders. This obligation pertains 
to the requirement that controllers report truth-
fully about the economic performance of their 
unit. The adherence to applicable legislation, 
internal norms and guidelines, and a strong pro-
fessional ethic, should contribute to the control-
any accounting and control practi-
tioners may not be very familiar with 
academic research in these fields. 
Unlike such fields like medicine and 
psychology, the relationship between academic 
research and professional practice seems rather 
weak. On the one hand, this may indicate that ac-
counting and control practice is fully developed, 
without any big questions left, that seems highly 
unlikely. On the other hand, this may mean that 
research in these fields fails to deliver useful 
insights. That may be closer to the truth. In any 
case, the lack of mutual interest between practice 
and theory is a pity, and requires our attention. 
Indeed, since researchers and practitioners share 
the objective of enhancing the quality of account-
ing and control in their organizations and firms, 
mutual inspiration will be beneficial.
Such mutual interest will be particular-
ly useful if we want to understand one of the 
big contemporary challenges in accounting and 
control. This challenge concerns the ‘right way’ 
to design the function of organizational control-
lers. Such job design should ensure that control-
lers are able to perform well in their dual re-
sponsibilities of serving local management and 
serving the firm. In this article I present an 
example of how academic research has aimed 
to increase our understanding of these roles of 
controllers in practice.
    LOCAL CONTROLLERS ADD THEIR 
SPECIALIST FINANCE AND ACCOuNTING 
KNOWLEDGE TO THE DETAILED 
KNOWLEDGE THEy HAVE ABOuT THEIR 
UNIT. THIS IS A POWERFUL COMBINATION. 
HOWEVER, INVOLVEMENT IN MANAGERIAL 
DECISION MAKING, AND THE ASSOCIATED 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OUTCOMES, 
IS LIKELy TO CAuSE STRONGER 
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE 
CONTROLLER AND LOCAL MANAGERS. THIS, 
IN TURN, MAY BE A CAUSE OF REDUCED 
INDEPENDENCE AND REDuCED INTEGRITy 
AND OBJECTIVITy OF uNIT REPORTING.
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When confronted with this case, controllers 
showed interesting reactions. First of all, we 
found large differences between controllers’ 
willingness to go along with the unit manager’s 
suggestion to use a conservative percentage. 
This suggests that the ideal type of controller, 
who would always react consistently, probably 
does not exist. These differences were explained 
by three additional factors that we included in 
our study. First, we differentiated the extent to 
which the controller in the case was involved in 
the development of the unit’s strategic decision 
making. Second, we differentiated the amount of 
social pressure that the unit manager put upon 
the controller to go along with the suggestion. 
Third, we measured, in a separate survey, a per-
sonality construct (Machiavellianism) which 
could explain individual inclination to give in to 
the demands of hierarchically powerful people. 
Together, these three factors, so common to actual 
situations and people, allowed quite an accurate 
prediction about controllers' responses in this 
situation. Controllers who were more involved in 
the strategic decision making, experienced higher 
pressure from the unit managers and were more 
inclined to give in to powerful people, were also 
more likely to go along with the unit manager’s 
suggestion. Obviously, the combination of high 
social pressure and heavy strategic involvement, 
is typical of the high pressure situation that con-
temporary controllers are advised to thrive in. If 
combined with certain personality characteris-
tics, however, this may result in violations of ac-
counting principles and eventually, the reduced 
quality of earning statements by firms.
Conclusions
The study that is summarized in this paper is 
only an example. However, I believe it is a good 
example on how practice and theory could be 
combined to provide useful insights. Critics may 
argue that understanding controller behavior 
should not be the goal, but that research should 
focus on delivering practical and implementable 
advice. But I believe that the role that research 
has to play is more fundamental and that the 
knowledge produced has a longer life expectancy 
than typical practical and implementable advice 
has. However, what the example does make 
clear is that the relationship between practical 
problems and theoretical answers is not an easy 
one, and requires deliberate cooperation. On 
this particular topic, researchers are willing to 
further explore the pros and cons of today’s roles 
of controllers and to understand how practical 
considerations may translate into fundamental 
and useful insights. There are indeed, still many 
big issues left for us to figure out. 
ticular, such forces could work silently and have 
the form of a bias or social pressure. Indeed, 
unit managers may try to influence control-
lers’ factual judgments. Also the mere involve-
ment of controllers in business decisions may 
cause them to be less factual and more subjec-
tive when reporting about those decisions. In 
any case, this is typically an issue that research 
may shed some light on.
In one study we invited controllers to take 
part in an academic study on their behavior in 
such a situation. We presented the following 
case to the controllers, and asked them what 
they would do. We designed a case of a firm, with 
several business units. In one of the business 
units, called Splash, the unit controller faces a 
request from his unit manager. 
“Splash produces sodas, lemonades, and ice cream. 
Gerard van Dinkel has been the general manager 
of Splash for three years. Wouter Simons has been 
Splash’s BU controller for five years. […] Over 
the years 2002 to 2004, Splash has gradually 
divested its activities in the soda market. Instead, 
it has changed its focus to ice cream and desserts. 
This change of focus also implies a change from 
customer products to intermediate products sold to 
restaurant chains and other companies in the food 
and beverages industry. In October 2004 it becomes 
clear that the results of this strategic change are 
somewhat disappointing and the chance that 
Splash will be able to reach its 2004 ROI target is 
very small […]. In October 2004, the Splash man-
agement team has a meeting to decide about the 
2005 budget proposal. Gerard van Dinkel, Splash’s 
general manager, suggests basing the proposal on 
conservative estimates. Both he and BU control-
ler Wouter Simons believe Splash should be able 
to make a ROI of 13.5% in 2005. However, Gerard 
van Dinkel asks Wouter Simons if he can come up 
with a proposal of a ROI target of 11%, because he 
feels it would be bad for the business unit to miss 
its targets two times in a row and he therefore does 
not want to take any risks. He also mentions that 
it would be undeserved if Splash’s managers miss 
their bonus again next year. BU controller Wouter 
Simons realizes that the only way to come up with 
a ROI proposal for 2005 of 11% is by making unre-
alistically low sales estimates and unrealistically 
high cost estimates. […]. We would like to know how 
likely you think it is that Wouter Simons proceeds 
to develop a budget proposal that contains the un-
realistically low ROI target of 11%. In making your 
assessment of this likelihood please also note the 
following: BU controller Wouter Simons is aware 
that the chance that corporate headquarters will 
find out that the ROI proposal of 11% is founded on 
unrealistically low estimates is negligible.”
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